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Abstract
Fuzzy authentication allows authentication based on the fuzzy matching of two
objects, for example based on the similarity of two strings in the Hamming metric,
or on the similiarity of two sets in the set difference metric. Aim of this paper is
to show other models and algorithms of secure fuzzy authentication, which can be
performed using the rank metric. A few schemes are presented which can then be
applied in different scenarios and applications.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a lot of research around the problem of authentication using
approximate matching under a certain metric of similarity, while still enabling a
secure storage of sensible authentication data. The typical, but not the only scenario,
where such a system is needed, is in the use of biometric features, like fingerprints,
for authentication purposes.
Several models have been proposed that may be more appropriate for different
applications. For example the fuzzy commitment scheme [8] models data as bit
strings and compares strings in the Hamming metric; the fuzzy vault [7] models
data as sets of elements and compares sets in the set difference metric.
In this paper we present fuzzy authentication schemes using the rank metric by
generalizing the schemes mentioned above for other model scenarios and highlight-
ing possible applications. The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2
recalls some mathematical concepts and definitions concerning rank metric codes
and linearized polynomials. Section 3 presents the fuzzy commitment scheme in the
rank distance, a model whereby the tolerance needed in the authentication is not
based on the number of different bits between two strings but on the similarity of
two matrices, more precisely on the rank of their difference. Section 4 is devoted to
a fuzzy vault scheme using linearized polynomials, which relates the set difference
with the rank metric. The scheme is an alternative to the standard fuzzy vault
based on Reed-Solomon decoding. Section 5 gives hints on possible applications and
model scenarios of the schemes presented in the previous sections.
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2 Rank Metric Codes and Linearized Polynomials
Let q be a prime power and let Fq denote the finite field with q elements. Recall
that Fqm is isomorphic (as a vector space over Fq) to the vector space F
m
q . One
then easily obtains the isomorphic description of matrices over the base field Fq as
vectors over the extension field, i.e. Fm×nq
∼= Fnqm .
Definition 1. The rank distance dR on F
m×n
q is defined by
dR(X,Y ) := rk(X − Y ), X, Y ∈ F
m×n
q .
In the same way it is possible to define the rank distance between two elements
x,y ∈ Fnqm as the rank of the difference of the respective matrix representations in
F
m×n
q .
A rank metric code C is a subset of Fm×nq (or F
n
qm) equipped with the rank
distance. The minimum distance of a rank metric code C is the quantity
dR(C) := min {dR(u, v) | u, v ∈ C, u 6= v} .
We can define special classes of rank metric codes introducing linearity. An Fqm -
linear rank metric code of dimension k is a rank metric code that is also a k-
dimensional subspace of the Fqm -vector space F
n
qm . An Fq-linear rank metric code
of dimension k′ is a rank metric code that is also a k′-dimensional subspace of the
Fq-vector space F
n
qm
∼= Fm×nq .
Observe that an Fqm -linear rank metric code of dimension k is also an Fq-linear
code of dimension mk.
We will use the notation [n, k, d]-code for a k-dimensional Fqm -linear code with
minimum distance d, and [nm, k′, d′]-code for a k′-dimensional Fq-linear code with
minimum distance d′.
Theorem 1 (Singleton-like Bound). Let C ⊆ Fm×nq be a rank metric code. Then
|C| ≤ min
{
qm(n−d+1), qn(m−d+1)
}
.
Proof. See [5], or [14, Theorem 1].
Definition 2. Codes attaining the Singleton-like bound are called Maximum Rank
Distance (MRD) Codes.
When n ≤ m a class of codes attaining the Singleton-like bound was first pro-
posed in [5] and then generalized in [9]. These codes are Fqm-linear rank metric
codes. Let (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F
n
qm be a vector, we denote the k × n s-Moore matrix by
Ms,k(v1, . . . , vn) :=


v1 v2 . . . vn
v
[s]
1 v
[s]
2 . . . v
[s]
n
...
...
v
[s(k−1)]
1 v
[s(k−1)]
2 . . . v
[s(k−1)]
n

 ,
where [i] := qi.
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Definition 3. Let g1, . . . , gn ∈ Fqm be linearly independent over Fq and let s be
coprime to m. We define a generalized Gabidulin code C ⊆ Fnqm of dimension k as
the linear block code with generator matrix Ms,k(g1, . . . , gn). Using the isomorphic
matrix representation we can interpret C as a matrix code in Fm×nq .
These codes are optimum for rank distance, since they are [n, k, n−k+1]-codes.
Moreover, for this class of codes there exist polynomial-time decoding algorithms
decoding up to their error-correcting capability t =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
, [10, 13, 17].
Observe that when s = 1, this definition of Gabidulin codes is the q-analog of
Reed-Solomon codes with the Hamming distance. Here, a set of distinct elements
is replaced by a set of linearly independent elements, and the power gji is replaced
by the Frobenius power g
[j]
i . Reed-Solomon codes can also be seen as evaluation of
polynomials of degree less than k in n distinct points. We can give a q-analog of
this interpretation for Gabidulin codes, as evaluation of linearized polynomials in n
linearly independent elements.
Definition 4. A linearized polynomial over Fqm is a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fqm [x]/(x
qm−
x) of the form
m−1∑
i=0
fix
[i].
We denote by Lm(Fqm) the space of linearized polynomials over Fqm .
Let Gk,s ⊆ Lm(Fqm) be the set defined as
Gk,s :=
{
f0x+ f1x
[s] + . . .+ fk−1x
[s(k−1)] | fi ∈ Fqm
}
.
Proposition 1. Let g1, . . . , gn ∈ Fqm be linearly independent over Fq and let s be
an integer coprime to m. Let moreover C be the Generalized Gabidulin code whose
generator matrix is Ms,k(g1, . . . , gn). Then
C = {(f(g1), f(g2), . . . , f(gn)) | f ∈ Gk,s} .
From now on we will write Gk,s(g1, . . . , gn) for such a code.
For many years Gabidulin codes have been the only known MRD codes over
Fqm . Recently some construction of non-Gabidulin MRD codes have been discovered
[2, 3], but many of these codes are not linear over Fqm . Some constructions of linear
non-Gabidulin MRD codes can be found in [6] and as a special class of the codes
presented in [16].
Although there are few known constructions of MRD codes, it was shown in [12]
that most linear rank metric codes are MRD and that the Gabidulin codes are only
a small franction among the MRD codes.
3 Fuzzy Commitment Scheme with the Rank Dis-
tance
In 1999 Juels and Wattenberg [8] proposed a fuzzy commitment scheme to allow
fuzzy authentication with secure storage of biometric data in binary form. In [15]
the authors revisited the scheme in the setting of an arbitrary finite field by focusing
on implementations and security concerns. In [1] they proposed a dual version of
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the scheme, called fuzzy syndrome hashing, featuring some advantages in terms of
security and use of iterative decoding. In [4] they presented scenarios involving burst
error correction and higher dimensional data.
Here we are going to describe a new fuzzy commitment scheme using the rank
metric. In a following section about applications, we will describe a few scenarios
where this scheme can be applied.
In our authentication model, we wish to consider two vectors b, b′ ∈ Fnqm (or,
equivalently, their matrix representations B,B′ ∈ Fm×nq ) as belonging to the same
person or entity as long as their rank distance is less than a certain predetermined
threshold. And for security concerns we do not want to store vectors (or matrices)
unencrypted.
Suppose now that we have a rank metric code C ⊆ Fnqm whose minimum distance
is d = 2t + 1 and assume there exists an efficient algorithm for decoding up to t
errors.
Let h : Fm×nq → F
m×r
q be a collision resistant hash function, i.e. such that it
is not feasible to compute an u ∈ h−1(v) for any v ∈ Fm×rq . Observe that a hash
function h′ : Fnqm → F
r
qm can be defined starting from h, as the diagram
F
m×n
q
h //

F
m×r
q

F
n
qm
h′ //
OO
F
r
qm
OO
shows.
As in the standard fuzzy commitment scheme, we select at random a codeword
cb ∈ C and we store the tuple
(l, h(cb))
where l = b− cb.
This scheme is essentially the analogue of the standard fuzzy commitment with
the difference that we use rank metric codes instead of Hamming codes. Analogously
as in [15] one can show the following result.
Theorem 2. If b ∈ Fnqm can be chosen uniformly over the entire ambient space F
n
qm ,
then computing b ∈ Fnqm from the stored data (l, h(cb)) is computationally equivalent
to invert the restricted hash function
h|C : C −→ F
r
qm .
4 A Linearized Polynomial Fuzzy Vault Scheme
The polynomial fuzzy vault (PFV) scheme was introduced in [7] and allows fuzzy
authentication in the set-difference metric. In [11] the authors proposed a fuzzy vault
scheme using codes in another metric, relating the set difference with the subspace
distance on the set of Grassmanians. The PFV scheme can also be generalized in a
natural way using linearized polynomials and codes over the rank metric as follows.
First, we make the following assumption about the set of features used for au-
thentication, both the set initially used to build the vault and the one submitted
later for authentication.
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Assumption 1. Assume that the set of features (A or W in the following) is given
by n Fq-linearly independent elements in Fqn , i.e. it is an Fq-basis for Fqn .
This is usually not a restrictive assumption given the follwing result:
Lemma 1. If the features are chosen with uniform distribution, then Assumption
1 is satisfied with probability
n−1∏
i=0
(qn − qi)
(qn − i)
≥
n−1∏
i=0
(1 − qi−n).
Proof. The number of Fq-basis of Fqn is
∏n−1
i=0
(qn−qi)
n! , while the number of subsets
of Fqn with cardinality n is
(
qn
n
)
.
Now, let ℓ < n be two positive integers and let 0 < s < n be another integer
coprime with n. Let (k0, . . . , kℓ−1) ∈ F
ℓ
qn the secret key and κ(x) = k0x + k1x
[s] +
. . .+kℓ−1x
[s(ℓ−1)] ∈ Ln(Fqn) be the corresponding linearized polynomial. Consider a
set of features A = {g1, . . . , gn} ⊆ Fqn given by n Fq-linearly independent elements.
Choose a random map λ : Fqn −→ Fqn such that λ(x) 6= κ(x) for all x ∈ B, where
B = Fqn rA.
Following the classical PFV scheme, we define the sets
Pauth = {(x, κ(x)) | x ∈ A} ,
Pchaff = {(x, λ(x)) | x ∈ B} ,
V = Pauth ∪ Pchaff .
Pauth is called set of authentic points, Pchaff is the set of chaff points, and V is
called set of vault points.
The last ingredients of the fuzzy vault scheme are the code
C = Gℓ,s(g1, . . . , gn)
and an error correction decoding algorithm for C.
For our constructions of the Linearized Polynomial Fuzzy Vault (LPFV), it is
convenient to consider a Gabidulin code as a code whose codewords consist of eval-
uations of a linearized polynomial f ∈ Gℓ,s over any set of n linearly independent
elements in Fqn . Concretely, we think of a codeword as a set of pairs {(gi, yi)}
n
i=1,
where gi ∈ Fqn , are linearly independent over Fq, and yi = f(gi), for a linearized
polynomial f ∈ Gℓ,s. In this framework, suppose that a witness attempts to gain
access to the key, and submits a set of features W ⊂ Fqn .
Given Assumption 1, if Z ⊆ V is the subset of vault points (x, y) with x ∈ W ,
we can consider the Fq-linear map
LZ : Fqn −→ Fqn
such that LZ(x) = y for all (x, y) ∈ Z. Now, think of the received word c
′ as
consisting of the set of pairs {(gi, LZ(gi))}
n
i=1, for gi ∈ A. The secret codeword of
the LPFV scheme is instead c, given by the set of pairs {(gi, κ(gi))}
n
i=1. With this
notation it is easy to see that
dR(c, c
′) = rk(κ− LZ).
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The following results relate the rank distance with the set difference, showing
that the rank metric can be a good approximation of the set-difference metric. Let
d∆(A,W ) := |(A\W ) ∪ (W\A)| denote the set-difference between A and W .
Proposition 2. In the setting of the LPFV scheme, suppose that the values λ(x),
for x ∈ B are chosen at random uniformly and independently in Fqnr{κ(x)}. Then
1. 2dR(c, c
′) ≤ d∆(A,W ).
2. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ n be an integer. Then
Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W ) | |A ∩W | = u} =
n−u−1∏
i=0
(qn − qi)
(qn − 1)
= 1 +O(q−u−1).
Proof. 1. Let W be the set of features submitted, and let u = |A ∩W |. Then
we have d∆(A,W ) = 2n − 2|A ∩W | = 2n − 2u. Consider now the Fq-linear
map LZ : Fqn −→ Fqn such that LZ(x) = y for (x, y) ∈ Z. The set of first
coordinates of Z is an Fq-basis of Fqn and the linear map κ−LZ is 0 on A∩W .
Therefore
dR(c, c
′) = rk(κ− LZ) ≤ n− u =
d∆(A,W )
2
.
2. Since the λ(x), for x ∈ B, are chosen at random uniformly and independently
in Fqn r {κ(x)}, then the values (LZ − κ)(x), for x ∈ W r (A ∩ W ) are
chosen at random uniformly and independently in Fqn r {0}. Furthermore,
the condition 2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W ) is equivalent to the condition that the
values (Lz − κ)(x), for x ∈W r (A ∩W ) are linearly independent. Hence,
Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W ) | |A ∩W | = u} =
∣∣∣{A ∈ Fn×(n−u)q | rk(A) = n− u}
∣∣∣
(qn − 1)(n−u)
.
Theorem 3. Under the same hypothesis of Proposition 2, the following statements
hold.
1. If d∆(A,W ) ≤ 2
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋
, then the vault recovers the key κ(x).
2.
Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W )} = 1 +O(q
−1).
Proof. 1. By Proposition 2 we have 2dR(c, c
′) ≤ d∆(A,W ) ≤ 2
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋
. Therefore
we are within the error-correction capability and we can correctly obtain the
codeword c, and hence the key κ(x).
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2. We can write Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W )} as
n∑
u=0
Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W ) | |A ∩W | = u}Pr {|A ∩W | = u}
=
n∑
u=0
(
1 +O(q−u−1)
)
Pr {|A ∩W | = u}
=
n∑
u=0
(
1 +O(q−1)
)
Pr {|A ∩W | = u}
=
(
1 +O(q−1)
) n∑
u=0
Pr {|A ∩W | = u}
=1 +O(q−1).
Remark. Probabilistic results in Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 do not depend on
the probability distribution of the choice of the features. We are only assuming that
our construction of the Linearized Polynomial Fuzzy Vault is made by choosing at
random uniformly and independently the values λ(x) for x ∈ B.
4.1 Generalization of the LPFV Scheme
In our construction of the LPFV we considered Gabidulin codes of length n over
Fqn . The motivation is that given a set of features W satisfying Assumption 1, the
map LZ : Fqn → Fqn is uniquely determined, and hence also the received word c
′.
We can generalize our LPFV considering Gabidulin codes of length n over the
field Fqm , where n < m, but we need to define the map LZ in a suitable way.
Before explaining how to construct LZ , we can observe that an analogue of
Lemma 1 holds and it can be proved in the same way, but in this case the probability
that the set of features is made of linearly independent elements is equal to
n−1∏
i=0
(qm − qi)
(qm − i)
= 1 +O(q−1−m+n).
Now, let W and A be the Fq-subspaces of Fqm spanned respectively by W and
A. First, we can observe that, in order to build the received word c′ as the set
{(gi, LZ(gi))}
n
i=1, we only need to define map LZ on A. We propose the following
construction.
We first define the application LZ on W as LZ(x) = y for all (x, y) ∈ Z. Then
complete W to a basis B of A+W , by adding the elements gi in increasing order
with respect to the indices i. For those gi, we set LZ(gi) = κ(gi) + α
qi , where
α ∈ Fqm and
{
αq
i
}m−1
i=0
is a normal basis of Fqm as an Fq-vector space.
In this way, our map is uniquely determined on A+W , and in particular on A.
Let again c be the codeword given by the set of pairs {(gi, κ(gi))}
n
i=1. With this
notation it is easy to see that
dR(c, c
′) = rk(κ− LZ)|A ≤ rk(κ− LZ).
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The following results are the analogues of Proposition 2 and Theorem 3, and they
relate the rank distance of c and c′ with the set difference of A and W .
Proposition 3. In the setting of the generalized LPFV scheme, suppose that the
values λ(x), for x ∈ B are chosen at random uniformly and independently in Fqm r
{κ(x)}.
1. Let the subspace distance be dS(A,W) := dimFq(A)+dimFq(W)− 2 dimFq(A∩
W). Then
dS(A,W) ≤ 2dR(c, c
′) ≤ dS(A,W) + 2 rk(κ− LZ)|A∩W ≤ d∆(A,W ).
2. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ n be two integers. Then
Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W ) | |A ∩W | = u, dim(A ∩W) = v} =
n−u−1∏
i=n−v
(qm − qi)
qm − 1
.
Proof. 1. Following the construction of the map LZ , we can write the subspace
A as the direct sum of A∩W and the subspace Â, where Â = 〈gi | i ∈ I〉 and
I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |I| = n− dimFq (A ∩W). Therefore we can write
rk(κ− LZ)|
Â
≤ rk(κ− LZ)|A ≤ rk(κ− LZ)|Â + rk(κ− LZ)|A∩W . (1)
Let r = dimFq (Â). By definition of the LZ , we have
rk(κ− LZ)|
Â
= rk(αq
i1
, . . . , αq
ir
).
By construction {αq
i
}m−1i=0 is a normal basis of Fqm over Fq, and hence we can
conclude that
rk(κ− LZ)|
Â
= r = dimFq (Â) = n− dimFq (A ∩W) =
dS(A,W)
2
.
Substituting this equation in (1) we obtain the first two inequalities.
For the last inequality we notice that the map (κ− LZ)|A∩W is 0 on |A ∩W |,
and therefore
rk(κ− LZ)|A∩W ≤ dimFq (A ∩W)− |A ∩W |.
Hence we can conclude that
dS(A,W) + 2 rk(κ− LZ)|A∩W ≤ 2n− 2|A ∩W | = d∆(A,W ).
2. Let u = |A ∩W |, v = dim(A ∩W). Then we can write
W = {u1, . . . , un−v, wn−v+1, . . . , wn−u, gj1 , . . . , gju} ,
where ui /∈ A for i = 1, . . . , n− v and wi ∈ ArA for i = n− v + 1, . . . , n− u.
Therefore 2 rk(κ− LZ)|
Â
= 2n− 2v, and the condition
rk(κ− LZ)|A = rk(κ− LZ)|Â + rk(κ− LZ)|A∩W = n− u
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is equivalent to the condition
rk(αq
i1
, . . . , αq
in−v
, (κ− LZ)(wn−v+1), . . . , (κ− LZ)(wn−u)) = n− u.
By hypothesis the values (LZ − κ)(wi), for i = n− v+ 1, . . . , n− u are chosen
at random uniformly and independently in Fqm r {0}, and we can conclude
that the probability we are looking for is equal to∣∣∣{A ∈ Fm×(v−u)q | rk(A | X) = n− u}
∣∣∣
(qm − 1)(v−u)
,
where X is the matrix representation over Fq of the vector (α
qi1 , . . . , αq
in−v
).
Since ∣∣∣{A ∈ Fm×(v−u)q | rk(A | X) = n− u
}∣∣∣ =
n−u−1∏
i=n−v
(qm − qi),
this concludes the proof.
Theorem 4. Under the same hypothesis of Proposition 3, the following statements
hold.
1. If d∆(A,W ) ≤ 2
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋
, then the vault recovers the key κ(x).
2.
Pr {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W )} = 1+ O(q
−1−m+n).
Proof. 1. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.1, using
Proposition 3.1.
2. In order to simplify the notation we introduce the events Du = {|A ∩W | = u},
Ev =
{
dimFq(A ∩W) = v
}
for 0 ≤ u, v ≤ n, andX = {2dR(c, c
′) = d∆(A,W )}.
Then we have
Pr {X} =
∑
0≤u≤v≤n
Pr {X | Du ∩ Ev}Pr {Du ∩ Ev}
=
∑
0≤u≤v≤n
(
1 +O(q−1−m−u+n)
)
Pr {Du ∩ Ev}
=
∑
0≤u≤v≤n
(
1 +O(q−1−m+n)
)
Pr {Du ∩ Ev}
=
(
1 +O(q−1−m+n)
) ∑
0≤u≤v≤n
Pr {Du ∩ Ev}
= 1+ O(q−1−m+n).
Remark. Suppose one wants to use a generalized LPFV scheme with n genuine
features, and suppose moreover that a field Fq and an extension field Fqm , with
m ≥ n, are given. By Theorem 4.2 we can see that the bigger is m the better is
the approximation of the set difference with the rank distance. On the other hand,
increasing m implies an increase of the computational cost of the operations. Then
one can choose the best m based on the application and the particular requirements
of the context.
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5 Applications
The schemes presented above can be applied in several scenarios for different pur-
poses. In this section we would like to give just a few examples.
One scenario for the fuzzy commitment scheme in the rank metric is the following.
Suppose B is the matrix used to create the stored tuple and imagine it as an image.
It may happen for some reason that B gets somehow damaged in a way that a
few rows (or columns) are erased or anyway not the same as before. One can then
authenticate with the new matrix B′ as long as not too many rows (or columns) are
different. In another situations the matrix B may be slightly changed into B′ by
having all elements increased by a common error, and again the difference between
the two matrices is a matrix of low rank, exactly 1 in this case.
Another scenario involves a multi-factor authentication problem. Suppose that
in order to perform authentication one needs a large number of conditions fulfilled,
namely imagine a matrix with a large number of columns whereby condition number
i is fulfilled whenever column number i equals a predetermined vector vi. If you want
to allow authentication as long as a certain big enough number of conditions are
satisfied, then the fuzzy commitment scheme in the rank metric can be used. Indeed
having two matrices A and A′ that both satisfy a certain condition corresponds to a
zero column in the difference A−A′ which directly affects the rank distance between
the two.
Applications for the linearized polynomial fuzzy vault scheme overlap with those
of the standard fuzzy vault, i.e. we are considering authentication based on the set
difference metric. It may be preferable to use the linearized version and decoding
in the rank metric for certain choices and combinations of parameters which are
usually dependent on the application. Also, the use of linear maps may be preferred
for certain implementations.
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